Friday, January 23, 2009

24, Torture & the American Military


Counterterrorism agent Jack Bauer, the chief protagonist in the Fox Television Network series “24,” rarely holds back when trying to extract information from a suspected or confirmed terrorist or to protect the United States from disaster. Over the course of his “career,” federal agent Bauer breaks a drug lord out of a federal prison, causing a riot and the death of at least one corrections officer. He assaults and seriously injures his partner to protect his undercover operation. He shoots and kills a known terrorist, even though she is no longer a threat. He interrogates a suspected terrorist while his partner cuts the suspect’s wrist. He fights heroin addiction after using the drug to convince drug cartel members that he has joined them. Again, to protect his cover, he points a gun at his partner’s head and squeezes the trigger, guessing, correctly, that the gun is not loaded. He tells a potential source of information that, if she does not cooperate, she will be sent to a foreign country for interrogation where her constitutional rights do not apply. He points a gun at a military pilot and orders the pilot to stay on course after the pilot has been given orders to turn the plane around. In an interrogation room, he fires a gun at a prisoner and all of these events occur in less than twenty-four hours during Season Three of the show. Season after season Bauer averts the country from disaster of apocalyptic proportions with derring-do and tactics that almost certainly violate U.S. and international law. And, he usually gets results.

Bauer's colleagues also resort to extreme measures in the face of serious threats to the country, even against other members of their unit. Twice, when the agency suspected a mole among the ranks, the director called in "Richards," the unit's resident torture expert. When summoned to the interrogation room, Richards, who rarely speaks, carries the tricks of his trade in a silver attaché case, the full contents of which we never see although his weapon of choice is usually a needle. All of this leads to an obvious question: does torture work? The experts say it does not.

A successful interrogation is one that extracts actionable, accurate intelligence from a subject and the lives of American troops and their allies may hang on the quality of the intelligence they have. Unfortunately, the value of intelligence tends to diminish over time and, usually within 24 hours, the enemy has adjusted to the capture of one of its operatives and the trail goes dead. Like other interrogation techniques, if torture works it must work fast before the enemy can react.

The question of torture's efficacy may be hypothetically answered in a number of ways: it works; it does not work; it only works with specific personality types; only certain types of torture work. The use of what are called "harsh" techniques deepens the problem. To some, the term "harsh methods" is a euphemism for torture. To others, the term appears to describe practices that fall somewhere between torture and techniques formally authorized for use by the United States military and other federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency.

While 24 suggests that torture works, no research has tested the efficacy of torture and ethical constraints prevent scientists from doing so. Even harsh interrogation techniques, however one defines them, cannot be measured in an experimental setting for the same reasons. And, although the methods formally authorized by the United States military have never been empirically tested, they share some common themes with the techniques used by law enforcement officers: isolation, fear, and rapport.

Law enforcement officers have known for years that building rapport with a suspect is the swiftest way to extract a truthful confession. Fear of what might come and isolation from friends, family, and lawyers can help speed the process and result in a suspect's confession, sometimes even before the paperwork is completed. The U.S. military has embraced these methods and if you talk to interrogators themselves they will forcefully argue that once violence enters the interrogation booth, the interrogation has failed.

The military trains intelligence personnel at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, home of its intelligence school, and graduates say that instructors emphasize the Military Code of Justice and the Geneva Conventions as much as they do specific intelligence and interrogation strategies. Intelligence soldiers themselves, like good detectives, know that those who do not follow the rules do great damage to both the United States military and the country itself. The interrogators that I have spoken with view interrogations as a battle of wits, like a good chess game, and gather information in accordance with U.S. and international law.

There is no doubt that problems persist. False confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions in the United States and many of those confessions are the result of questionable practices by police officers. Some military interrogators still use methods that unquestionably violate U.S. and international law and the American military needs to do a better job of weeding out those who are unfit to serve. Their presence does a disservice to the intelligence corps members who serve honorably and effectively.

Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Bagram have become symbols of all that is wrong with American policy in the fight against terrorism but they do not tell the whole story. Evidence suggests that the vast majority of federal counterterrorism agents and military interrogators pride themselves on obtaining information by following the rules.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009


The CIA's interrogation methods during the "War on Terrorism" have focused attention on a once obscure, out of print book called the "Manipulation of Human Behavior." The book, which some have dubbed the CIA's "torture bible," was a series of articles in book form that reviewed the state of interrogation research at the time of its publication, 1961. The furor over this book and its use by the CIA has deflected attention from another highly influential book that influenced the agency's offensive interrogation of research.

Joost Meerloo, a lecturer at Columbia University, published a book, The Rape of the Mind, in 1956 that reviewed mind control techniques and explored why people falsely confess. The book was inspired, in part, by numerous "false confessions" cases both inside and outside of the American military.

American soldiers were not the only subjects who had been reportedly “brainwashed” by the communists. Others, including a Hungarian cardinal, an ITT executive, and a number of journalists, offered public admissions to espionage charges after being “brainwashed.” Michael Otterman, in his book American Torture discusses the mind control" hysteria generated in part by the rise of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China.

A 1954 story in the New York Times by Meerloo posed this lurid headline: "Pavlov’s Dog and Communist Brainwashers…totalitarians seek to enslave the human mind.” In the Times article Meerloo, a psychiatrist, describes in detail the techniques used by the Soviet Union to elicit confessions.

In stage one, the prisoner is dulled by rapid, continual questioning, forced to stand, denied access to showers, and exposed to cold, among other things. During this stage, as questioning continues, new interrogators confront the subject with errors in his statements and the subject is reduced to "an animal."

In stage two, “reconditioning” begins. For each act of compliance, his captors award the prisoner a small privilege, such as a shower, a warm cell, or a restful sleep. At this point, Meerloo writes, the victim enters a “hypnotic state” and is “ready to confess.” The interrogator can prompt the subject to "confess" to almost anything because of the breakdown in the subject's will and humanity.

Friday, January 9, 2009

Looking for military interrogators...

I am conducting a study designed to address some of the gaps in knowledge about interrogations conducted by military interrogators and their counterparts in federal counterterrorism agencies in the United States and provide information about methods from their perspectives, based on their experiences. Kassin and his colleagues(2007) conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers and this study will follow that model, using different populations to obtain two distinct samples: military interrogators and counterterrorism agents. Like that study, this survey will ask participants to address and self-report on a number of issues, some in common with law enforcement and others that apply specifically to military and counter terrorism interrogations.

Participants will be asked to estimate, rate and self-report on a number of facets of their work: (1) their ability to detect truth or deception; (2) for military interrogators, their own opinions and practices with regard to 13 of the general approach techniques authorized by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook; (3) the importance of rapport building to extract information from a subject; (4) the applicability of law enforcement techniques to interrogations of terrorists; (5) the frequency, length and timing of interrogations and (6) training. Like the law enforcement study, the goal here is to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators and counterterrorism agents. Subsequent research can then test the interrogation methods that the subjects of this study believe are the most effective and focus on practices and beliefs unique to the military and counterterrorism context. This study will begin to shed light on practices currently in use by counterterrorism agents and the United States Army, provide potential empirical support for those practices that prove efficacious, and highlight those techniques that are of little value. It can dispel myths under which interrogators may operate.

Interrogators know better than I do that good intelligence obtained from human sources can save lives and win wars. Science can help point the way. Please contact me if you would like to help or participate.

In their article "Brainwashing, Conditioning and DDD," Farber, Harlow, and West (1957) examined the techniques used on American POWs to elicit false confessions, self-denunciations, or propagandistic statements in support of their captors during the Korean conflict. Invictus has a lengthy discussion of the article that is an excellent read.

Joseph Margulies, in a controversial piece in the Washington Post, draws an analogy between the methods used by the North Koreans and the Chinese and those approved by the Bush Administration today. Margulies, a law professor at Northwestern University and author of "Guantanamo and the Abuse of Power," argues that history has been ignored by U.S. policy makers and the "touchless torture" employed by the Communists is effective only for producing false confessions. Many disagree with Margulies and object to the moral equivalency he appears to draw between the U.S. and those regimes.

Lewis Carlson provides a less heated accounting of the experience of American POWs in the Korean War. His book Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War is an oral history of American POWs during that conflict.Carlson conducted interviews with Korean POWs in part to determine if the conditions of their confinement helped produce false confessions at higher rates when compared to American prisoners in other wars. Carlson found that the North Koreans used many of the same methods as the Soviet Union, including beatings, starvation, sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures and "never-ending" interrogations. Marathon interrogation sessions, according to his accounts, caused subjects to become so disoriented that they could no longer distinguish what they knew from what they do not know. These conditions, writes Carlson, caused prisoners to break down and "cooperate" with their interrogators to survive. For some, cooperation included falsely confessing to war crimes.

Wednesday, January 7, 2009

False Confessions & Torture - Part 2


Most of the existing literature about interrogations in a military context supports five overall principles: the stresses of war and capture generally have a negative effect on a prisoner's ability to provide truthful and accurate statements to his or her interlocutor; both the conditions of confinement and the application of psychological pressures, such as isolation or sensory deprivation, negatively affect a prisoner's ability to provide accurate and actionable intelligence; rapport building, while often time consuming, is the best technique for extracting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; historically, many individual interrogators generally claim that rapport building is the best technique for eliciting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; there is no "magic bullet" that quickly induces compliance and cooperation in an interrogation subject.

In the current debate about interrogation methods, much of this history appears to have been ignored.

Sunday, January 4, 2009

False Confessions & Torture - Part 1


In 1954, Marine pilot Colonel Frank H. Schwable appeared before a Naval Board of Inquiry investigating his behavior while held captive by North Korea. Schwable was shot down on July 8, 1952 near Hwachon Reservoir. In the winter of 1952-1953, after undergoing both physical and psychological torture, Schwable "confessed" that the United States was using germ warfare against its adversaries. After a show trial, Schwable was ultimately convicted of war crimes by the Chinese. This confession came after months spent trying to break Schwable's will. During his confinement, at various times, Schwable was kept in solitary confinement, forbidden from shaving or washing himself, starved, forced to maintain stress positions, slapped and denied medical care. The North Koreans and Chinese did not subject Schwable to stereotypical types of physical torture (for a good history of torture, read Torture & Democracy by Darius Rejali)but Schwable and other U.S. airmen claimed that the psychological pressure applied by the Communists had a greater effect on their well-being than any physical techniques they employed. It was the psychological pressures that eventually "broke" some American P.O.W.s.

Friday, January 2, 2009

Success with rapport building techniques.


Cloonan and Alexander, interrogators with 50 years of experience between them, both attest to the effectiveness of building rapport with an interrogation subject. History supports their position. Most of the existing literature about interrogations in a military context supports five overall principles: the stresses of war and capture generally have a negative effect on a prisoner's ability to provide truthful and accurate statements to his/her interlocutor; both the conditions of confinement and the application of psychological pressures, such as isolation or sensory deprivation, negatively affect a prisoner's ability to provide accurate and actionable intelligence; rapport building, while often time consuming, is the best technique for extracting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; historically, many individual interrogators generally claim that rapport building is the best technique for eliciting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; there is no "magic bullet" that quickly induces compliance and cooperation in an interrogation subject.

Jack Cloonan on interrogating terrorists - Part 2

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Retired FBI agent Jack Cloonan discusses interrogating terrorists - Part 1

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